Bangladesh's Transit Leverage: India's Landlocked Northeast Depends on Dhaka

India’s Geographic Nightmare

On the map of South Asia, India’s Northeast presents an extraordinary vulnerability: seven states and Sikkim, home to over 40 million people, connected to the Indian mainland by a sliver of land so narrow it has earned the ominous nickname “Chicken’s Neck.”

The Siliguri Corridor is the sole terrestrial link between India’s Northeast and the rest of the country. At its narrowest point, it measures just 22 kilometers wide. This strip is:

• The logistical lifeline for over 40 million people
• The only land route for military reinforcements to the Northeast
• Bordered on all sides by foreign territory: Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China’s Tibet
• Subject to seasonal disruptions, congestion, and strategic vulnerability

This geographic reality creates profound strategic anxiety in New Delhi — and profound strategic leverage in Dhaka.

flowchart TB
    subgraph Mainland["Indian Mainland"]
        KOL["Kolkata
Major Port"]
    end

    subgraph Corridor["Siliguri Corridor
(22 km wide)"]
        SIL["Chicken's Neck
Sole Land Link"]
    end

    subgraph Northeast["India's Northeast
(40 million people)"]
        TRI["Tripura"]
        ASM["Assam"]
        MEG["Meghalaya"]
        MIZ["Mizoram"]
        NAG["Nagaland"]
        MAN["Manipur"]
        ARU["Arunachal Pradesh"]
    end

    subgraph Bangladesh["Bangladesh Territory"]
        CHT["Chittagong Port
200 km from NE"]
        DHK["Dhaka"]
    end

    KOL -->|"1,600 km
via Siliguri"| SIL
    SIL --> ASM
    ASM --> TRI
    ASM --> MEG
    ASM --> MIZ
    ASM --> NAG
    ASM --> MAN
    ASM --> ARU

    TRI -.->|"200 km
via Bangladesh"| CHT

    style SIL fill:#ffcccc,stroke:#e31e24,color:#333
    style CHT fill:#006a4e,stroke:#333,color:#fff
    style TRI fill:#f5f5f5,stroke:#333

  

The Distance Differential: Bangladesh’s Trump Card

The numbers tell the story of India’s dependence:

This is not a marginal difference — it is a 75% reduction in distance and a proportional reduction in costs, time, and logistical complexity.

Why India Needs Bangladesh More Than Vice Versa

The asymmetry is stark:

India’s Position: Geographic Trap

• Northeast has no alternative sea access without Bangladesh
• Siliguri Corridor is a chokepoint vulnerable to disruption
• Economic development of Northeast impossible without Bangladesh connectivity
• Military logistics compromised without transit routes

Bangladesh’s Position: Multiple Options

• Chittagong and Mongla ports serve Bangladesh’s own needs
• Maritime access to global markets independent of India
• Alternative partners available: China, Japan, ASEAN, Middle East
• No geographic vulnerability comparable to India’s Northeast

The fundamental asymmetry: India’s 40 million Northeast citizens have no alternative to Bangladesh transit. Bangladesh’s 170 million citizens have multiple alternatives to Indian engagement.

The Infrastructure India Built — Through Japanese Money

Japan’s massive investment in Bangladesh infrastructure makes sense only when understood as solving India’s problem:

Matarbari Deep Sea Port ($4.6 billion)

• Location: Cox’s Bazar, just 100 km from India’s Northeast
• JICA description: “Creating an economic zone of 300 million people by connecting Kolkata and Dhaka with Matarbari Port”
• Strategic purpose: Gateway for India’s landlocked Northeast, not primarily for Bangladesh

The BIG-B Initiative

Japan’s Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) explicitly aims to:

• Connect Indian manufacturing to Bay of Bengal ports
• Provide transit for India’s landlocked northeastern states
• Create cross-border value chains serving Indian industry

Roads and Rail

JICA has funded:

• Road networks connecting Indian border crossings to Bangladeshi ports
• Rail infrastructure enabling freight from Northeast India through Bangladesh
• Logistics hubs positioned to serve Indian transit needs

The irony: Japan spent billions building Bangladesh’s infrastructure, but designed it primarily for Indian benefit. A sovereign Bangladesh can redirect these investments toward national development priorities.

The Hasina Era: Surrender of Leverage

Under Sheikh Hasina (2009-2024), Bangladesh systematically surrendered its transit leverage:

What Hasina Gave Away

1. Transit rights through Bangladesh to India’s Northeast — without adequate compensation
2. Port access at Chittagong and Mongla for Indian goods
3. Rail connectivity agreements prioritizing Indian access
4. Transshipment permissions for Indian cargo

What Bangladesh Received

• Minimal transit fees that did not reflect true value
• Infrastructure designed for Indian access, not Bangladeshi development
• Political alignment that subordinated Dhaka to Delhi
• No equivalent access to Indian markets or territory

The Agartala-Akhaura Rail Link: A Case Study

The Agartala-Akhaura railway (inaugurated November 2023) illustrates the imbalance:

• India’s benefit: Reduces Kolkata-Agartala distance by 1,100 km
• India’s funding: Bangladesh portion funded by India’s Ministry of External Affairs
• Bangladesh’s benefit: Minimal — serves Indian transit, not Bangladeshi trade
• Current status: Halted in April 2025 due to political turmoil — revealing India’s vulnerability

India’s Panic: The Bypass Projects

Post-August 2024, India has frantically pursued alternatives to Bangladesh dependency:

Shillong-Silchar Highway (Rs 22,864 crore)

• Fast-tracked approval in 2025
• Four-lane highway through difficult terrain
• Links to Kaladan corridor in Myanmar
• Designed to bypass Bangladesh entirely

Nepal Route Development

• Rail through Jogbani in Bihar via Nepal
• Alternative access to Northeast avoiding Siliguri chokepoint
• Requires Nepal cooperation — not guaranteed

Myanmar Kaladan Corridor

• Multimodal route through Myanmar’s Sittwe port
• Plagued by delays, security concerns, cost overruns
• Years from operational status

What India’s panic reveals: New Delhi knows it depends on Bangladesh. These Rs 50,000+ crore bypass projects are insurance against a sovereign Bangladesh asserting its leverage.

Bangladesh’s Leverage: How to Use It

The post-August 2024 era offers Bangladesh an opportunity to recalibrate:

Principle 1: No Free Transit

Transit rights are valuable. Bangladesh should extract:

• Transit fees reflecting true value (not token payments)
• Revenue sharing from goods transiting to India’s Northeast
• Infrastructure investment in Bangladeshi ports and roads serving transit
• Reciprocal access for Bangladeshi goods to Indian markets

Principle 2: Development, Not Just Transit

Infrastructure should serve Bangladeshi development:

• Industrial zones along transit corridors employing Bangladeshis
• Value addition in Bangladesh rather than pure transit
• Technology transfer as condition for infrastructure approval
• Local content requirements in transit-related investments

Principle 3: Strategic Balance

Transit leverage should inform broader negotiations:

• Water sharing agreements (Teesta, etc.) as quid pro quo
• Trade balance improvement as condition for transit expansion
• Border security cooperation with adequate compensation
• Political respect — treating Bangladesh as sovereign partner, not client state

Principle 4: Diversified Partnerships

Bangladesh should not trade India dependency for any other dependency:

• Japan investments redirected toward bilateral development
• China engagement on Bangladesh’s terms
• US and EU partnerships for market access
• ASEAN connectivity for regional diversification

Policy Recommendations for Bangladesh

Immediate Actions (0-6 months)

1. Comprehensive transit audit: Document all transit arrangements, their terms, and their value
2. Renegotiation mandate: Authorize Foreign Ministry to renegotiate transit terms
3. Fee structure development: Establish value-based transit fee framework
4. Infrastructure review: Assess whether Japanese-funded projects serve Bangladeshi or Indian interests

Short-Term Actions (6-18 months)

1. Transit agreement revision: Present India with revised terms for continued access
2. Port capacity assessment: Ensure Chittagong and Mongla can leverage increased transit
3. Industrial corridor planning: Develop Bangladeshi employment zones along transit routes
4. Japanese engagement: Reframe JICA projects as bilateral partnerships, not India connectivity

Medium-Term Strategy (18-36 months)

1. Regional connectivity hub: Position Bangladesh as logistics hub for South/Southeast Asia
2. Blue economy development: Leverage Bay of Bengal position for maritime economy
3. Transit revenue optimization: Maximize returns from geographic advantage
4. Alternative partner cultivation: Ensure no single-power dependency

The Strategic Calculus

India’s Northeast dependency means:

Bangladesh holds cards it has never played.

Conclusion: From Supplicant to Strategic Actor

For decades, Bangladesh approached India as a supplicant — grateful for transit arrangements, accepting terms set by Delhi, subordinating its leverage to political alignment.

The geographic reality has always told a different story. India’s Northeast is landlocked; Bangladesh controls the keys. India’s alternatives (Myanmar, Nepal) are expensive, unreliable, and years away. Bangladesh’s alternatives (maritime trade, diversified partnerships) are available today.

The August 2024 political transition creates an opportunity for strategic recalibration. Bangladesh need not become hostile to India — but it must become strategic with India. Transit access should be negotiated, not gifted. Infrastructure should serve Bangladeshi development, not just Indian connectivity. Geographic advantage should translate into policy leverage.

India’s frantic investment in bypass routes reveals New Delhi’s awareness of the vulnerability. Bangladesh’s awareness — and willingness to leverage it — must now catch up.

This Issue Brief represents the analysis of the Inqilab Delta Forum research team.

Sources:

1. Wikipedia, “Siliguri Corridor,” accessed December 2025.
2. World Bank, “Bangladesh Corridor Vital to India’s ‘Act East’ Policy,” September 2017.
3. Observer Research Foundation, “In Search of the Sea: Opening India’s Northeast to the Bay of Bengal,” 2024.
4. Railway Gazette, “Agartala-Akhaura Cross-Border Link Inaugurated,” November 2023.
5. Swarajya, “Unlocking India’s North East to Bay of Bengal Through New Transit Agreement with Bangladesh,” 2024.
6. Swarajya, “New Northeast-Kolkata Sea Route Via Myanmar to Bypass Bangladesh,” 2025.
7. WION News, “Japan’s FOIP Plan Focuses on Bangladesh’s Matarbari Port,” March 2024.
8. JICA, “Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) Initiative,” Project Documentation, 2024.
9. Press Information Bureau of India, “Agartala-Akhaura Railway Project,” 2023.
10. South Asia Monitor, “Chill in India-Bangladesh Ties Taking Heavy Toll on Cross-Border Trade,” 2025.
11. Wikipedia, “Akhaura-Agartala Line,” accessed December 2025.

Related Analysis:

• The India Lens: Why Great Powers Cannot See Bangladesh — The comprehensive framework explaining how major powers filter Bangladesh through India
• Japan’s Bangladesh Paradox: Investments for India’s Benefit? — Examining whether Japanese investments serve India or Bangladesh
• America’s South Asia Reset: From India-First to Bilateral Pragmatism — How US policy is shifting post-Operation Sindoor