DELTA DISPATCH
Bay of Bengal Security Initiative

The Soft Target: Why BJP's India May Attempt a Limited Incursion on Bangladesh

Inqilab Delta Forum | Bay of Bengal Security Initiative | December 25, 2025

Key Findings

“When Medicine Fails, Surgery Becomes Necessary”

On November 25, 2025, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma—one of BJP’s most influential leaders and a potential future Prime Minister—made a statement that should alarm every Bangladeshi:

“When medicine fails, surgery becomes necessary.”

Speaking at News18’s Rising Assam Conclave, Sarma declared that diplomatic solutions with Bangladesh were failing and that a “permanent resolution” might require surgical intervention. He emphasized the threat to India’s Northeast, particularly the vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor—the narrow 20-22 kilometer “chicken’s neck” connecting mainland India to its eight northeastern states.

More ominously, Sarma suggested India may need to secure “20-22 kilometers of land, through diplomacy or other means” to safeguard this corridor.

This was not a slip of the tongue. It was a trial balloon—testing public reaction to the idea of territorial acquisition from Bangladesh. And it came from a man who, on May 27, 2025, lamented that Indira Gandhi’s government “missed a crucial opportunity to address deep-rooted challenges” after the 1971 victory, suggesting that opportunity should have been “used properly.”

The message is unmistakable: senior BJP leadership is openly discussing military options against Bangladesh.

The Strategic Logic of a Soft Target

To understand why India might consider limited military action against Bangladesh, one must understand the trap BJP has created for itself.

The Unactionable Enemies

For a decade, BJP has cultivated rage against Pakistan and China. But nuclear deterrence makes genuine conflict with either nation existentially dangerous:

Against Pakistan:

Against China:

Yet BJP has promised its electorate muscular nationalism. When economic failures mount—unemployment, inflation, agricultural distress—the pressure for dramatic external action increases. The 2024 election (240 seats, 32 short of majority) showed the limits of temple politics and religious polarization alone.

Why Bangladesh Fits

Bangladesh presents what strategists call a “permissive environment” for limited operations:

Factor Pakistan China Bangladesh
Nuclear Weapons Yes Yes No
Global Military Rank 9th 3rd 37th
Active Troops 654,000 2,035,000 163,000
Alliance Protection China backing Superpower Limited
Retaliation Capability High Extreme Moderate
International Response Strong Strong Likely Muted

The military disparity is stark. India’s 1.45 million active troops versus Bangladesh’s 163,000 creates a ratio approaching 9:1. India ranks 4th globally in military power; Bangladesh ranks 37th. This asymmetry makes limited operations—cross-border strikes, “hot pursuit” incursions, or seizure of border territory—operationally feasible with minimal risk of catastrophic escalation.

The Sikkim Precedent

India has absorbed a sovereign nation before. In 1975, RAW orchestrated the annexation of Sikkim—a Himalayan kingdom that had been an Indian protectorate since 1950. RAW founder Rameshwar Nath Kao personally initiated the operation at PM Indira Gandhi’s request, spending 1973-1975 “creating the right conditions” through espionage. By May 15, 1975, Sikkim became India’s 22nd state. The method: manufactured internal instability, followed by “protective” intervention, followed by absorption.

Bangladesh is larger and annexation is implausible—but limited territorial seizure or “punitive” incursions are not.

The Infrastructure Is Already in Place

Since August 2024, India has been positioning military assets for potential Bangladesh operations. This is not speculation—it is documented military deployment.

Three New Border Garrisons (2024-2025)

1. Lachit Borphukan Military Station (Dhubri, Assam)

2. Chopra Base (West Bengal)

3. Kishanganj Military Camp (Bihar)

Weapons Systems Deployed

Under Trishakti Corps (33 Corps) command, India has positioned:

This is not defensive positioning. The Siliguri Corridor has been India’s vulnerability for decades—if defense were the goal, these deployments would have occurred long ago. The timing—immediately after Bangladesh’s July Revolution and the installation of a government hostile to India—reveals offensive intent.

Transit Route Alternatives

India is simultaneously reducing its dependence on Bangladesh transit:

These moves suggest India is preparing for a scenario where Bangladesh transit is no longer available—either due to Bangladeshi denial or Indian military action that makes cooperation impossible.

The Pretexts Being Manufactured

No military action occurs without justification. India is systematically constructing multiple pretexts for potential intervention:

1. Hindu Protection

The Manufactured Crisis:

Since Sheikh Hasina’s fall on August 5, 2024, Indian media has waged an unprecedented disinformation campaign:

The Reality:

Bangladesh police data tells a different story: 98.4% of reported attacks on minorities between August 5-20 were due to political reasons, not religious motives. An independent Netra News investigation found that “none of the murders bore clear signs of religious or communal motives.”

Yet the narrative serves its purpose. “Bangladesh Files” exhibitions—modeled on the anti-Muslim “Kashmir Files” film—are touring West Bengal, building the Hindu victimhood case for domestic consumption.

The Pretext Being Constructed:

“Protection of Hindus” could justify cross-border “rescue” operations, “punitive” strikes against “persecutors,” or establishment of “safe zones” in border areas. International precedent exists: Russia’s “protection of Russian speakers” in Ukraine, India’s own “protection of Tamils” justification for IPKF deployment in Sri Lanka.

2. Cross-Border Terrorism

The Allegations:

India’s Ministry of External Affairs announced that “14 terrorists affiliated with Ansarullah Bangla Team have been arrested by the Assam police in coordination with other security agencies since December 2024.”

The Amplification:

The Pretext Being Constructed:

“Hot pursuit” of terrorists across the border, strikes on alleged “terrorist infrastructure,” or “pre-emptive” operations to prevent attacks on Indian territory. This follows the exact template used against Pakistan—Pulwama to Balakot, Pahalgam to Operation Sindoor.

3. Siliguri Corridor Security

The Vulnerability:

The Siliguri Corridor—roughly 200km long but only 20-22km wide at its narrowest—is India’s sole land connection to its eight northeastern states. Over 40 million people depend on this logistical lifeline.

The Provocation:

Bangladeshi leaders have made statements explicitly referencing this vulnerability:

The Pretext Being Constructed:

“Strategic security” could justify seizure of border territory to widen the corridor—exactly what Assam CM Sarma suggested with his “20-22 kilometers of land” statement. The argument: Bangladesh’s hostility makes permanent territorial buffer necessary.

4. Water Crisis

The Approaching Deadline:

The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty expires December 12, 2026. This treaty governs water flow from the Farakka Barrage—built by India 17km upstream from Bangladesh. Without renewal, India faces no legal constraint on water diversion.

The Leverage:

The Pretext Being Constructed:

Water disputes could be manufactured into “provocations” requiring military response, or treaty expiration could be used as leverage for territorial concessions. More likely, water crisis exacerbates other tensions, providing cumulative justification for action.

5. Chinese Encirclement

Indian Anxieties:

The Pretext Being Constructed:

“Preventing Chinese strategic encirclement” provides national security justification for action. The argument: Bangladesh is becoming a Chinese forward operating base threatening India’s eastern flank, requiring pre-emptive measures.

The Scenarios

Based on military positioning, rhetoric escalation, and pretext construction, several scenarios emerge:

Scenario 1: Cross-Border Strikes (Most Likely)

Model: Operation Sindoor against Pakistan (2025)

Trigger: Terrorist attack in India blamed on Bangladesh-based groups

Execution:

Objective:

Risk Level: Moderate—Bangladesh lacks capability for significant retaliation, but international response uncertain

Scenario 2: Hot Pursuit Incursions (Likely)

Model: Uri “surgical strikes” (2016)

Trigger: Cross-border militant incident or manufactured provocation

Execution:

Objective:

Risk Level: Lower—deniable, limited, difficult for Bangladesh to counter

Scenario 3: Territorial Seizure (Possible)

Model: Sikkim annexation (1975)

Trigger: Extended crisis—Hindu persecution claims, water dispute, or Chinese presence

Execution:

Objective:

Risk Level: Higher—requires occupation, faces international condemnation, but Bangladesh cannot militarily expel Indian forces

Scenario 4: Covert Destabilization (Ongoing)

Model: RAW operations in Sri Lanka, Sikkim

Trigger: Already underway

Execution:

Objective:

Risk Level: Low for India—deniable, ongoing, cumulative effect

The RAW Mandate

According to Ashok Raina’s “Inside RAW,” India’s intelligence agency was given “a virtual carte blanche to conduct destabilization operations in neighboring countries.” The explicit list included seven countries: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Pakistan and Maldives. Sikkim was absorbed. Sri Lanka was invaded. Nepal faced blockade. This is not conspiracy theory—it is documented institutional mandate.

The Timing Factors

Several convergences create windows for potential action:

Electoral Calendar

Treaty Expiration

December 12, 2026: Ganges Water Sharing Treaty expires. Negotiations for renewal create crisis opportunity—either as leverage or as pretext for escalation when talks fail.

Regime Vulnerability

The Yunus interim government faces:

Each month that passes allows Bangladesh to strengthen position. From India’s perspective, acting before Bangladesh stabilizes may be strategically preferable.

Why It Might Not Happen

Despite the concerning indicators, several factors constrain Indian action:

International Response

Economic Interdependence

Military Reality

Domestic Costs

What Bangladesh Must Do

Regardless of whether India acts, Bangladesh must prepare for the possibility:

Immediate Measures

  1. Strengthen Border Defenses: Not to match India, but to raise the cost of incursion
  2. Modernize Air Defense: Acquire systems capable of deterring air strikes
  3. International Coalition Building: Ensure Western and Chinese stakeholders have incentive to prevent Indian adventurism
  4. Counter-Disinformation: Aggressively rebut false narratives about Hindu persecution
  5. Document BSF Violence: Build international legal case through ICC mechanisms

Strategic Posture

  1. Deepen China-Pakistan Coordination: Create three-front dilemma that makes Bangladesh action irrational
  2. Economic Leverage: Reduce Indian transit dependence gradually
  3. Water Diplomacy: Internationalize river disputes before treaty expiration
  4. Military Doctrine: Develop asymmetric capabilities that increase costs of occupation

Political Preparation

  1. National Unity: Ensure domestic political divisions don’t provide intervention pretext
  2. Minority Protection: Genuine protection of Hindu community removes propaganda ammunition
  3. Diplomatic Offensive: Build relationships that isolate India if aggression occurs
  4. Public Awareness: Prepare population for possibility of Indian action

Conclusion: Prepared, Not Paranoid

India may never conduct a limited incursion against Bangladesh. The costs may remain too high, the international response too uncertain, the benefits too marginal. Rationality may prevail.

But rationality did not prevent Operation Blue Star. Rationality did not prevent the Gujarat violence. Rationality did not prevent the Kashmir lockdown. When nationalist politics requires external enemies and domestic pressures mount, rationality often loses to political expedience.

Bangladesh cannot control India’s decisions. But Bangladesh can shape the calculus that India’s decision-makers must consider. Every improvement in defense capability, every international partnership, every economic diversification, every diplomatic success raises the cost of aggression and lowers the probability of attack.

The goal is not to match India’s military—that is impossible. The goal is to ensure that any Indian military adventure costs more than it gains. Deterrence does not require equality; it requires making aggression irrational.

When Assam’s Chief Minister speaks of “surgery,” Bangladesh must ensure the patient is not on the operating table. When BJP leaders lament “missed opportunities” from 1971, Bangladesh must ensure no new opportunities arise. When Indian media manufactures Hindu victimhood, Bangladesh must ensure reality undermines propaganda.

The soft target must harden. Not through belligerence, but through preparation. Not through provocation, but through deterrence. Not through isolation, but through coalition.

BJP’s India may attempt a limited incursion on Bangladesh. The question is whether Bangladesh will be ready when they try.

The Bottom Line

India is positioning military assets, constructing pretexts, and openly discussing “surgical” solutions for Bangladesh. While full-scale war remains unlikely, limited operations—cross-border strikes, hot pursuit incursions, or even territorial seizure—are operationally feasible given the massive military asymmetry. Bangladesh cannot prevent India from attempting such action, but can raise the costs to make it irrational. The time for preparation is now—before the “surgery” begins.

This Delta Dispatch represents the analysis of the Inqilab Delta Forum research team.

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India Relations Security & Defense BJP Military Strategy Bangladesh Siliguri Corridor Hindu Nationalism Border Security Strategic Analysis

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