India Is Not Russia: Why the Ukraine Playbook Won't Apply to Bangladesh

When tensions rise between India and Bangladesh, comparisons to Russia-Ukraine inevitably emerge. The logic seems intuitive: a larger, militarily superior neighbor with historical grievances, facing a smaller state seeking strategic autonomy. Will India do to Bangladesh what Russia did to Ukraine?

The answer is no—and understanding why reveals what India will actually do instead.

Why India Cannot Be Russia

The Russia-Ukraine analogy fails because India lacks the structural conditions that enabled Russia’s 2022 invasion. These are not minor differences but fundamental constraints that shape strategic calculus in New Delhi.

Economic Vulnerability vs. Energy Leverage

Russia survived Western sanctions because it held leverage over European energy supplies. Europe depended on Russian gas; this dependency limited the West’s willingness to impose truly devastating sanctions and gave Moscow time to reorient toward China and India as alternative markets.

India possesses no such leverage.

India exports 18% to the United States alone, another 20% to the European Union, and 23-24% to Gulf states that maintain strong China-Pakistan ties. Any military aggression triggering sanctions from these markets would devastate India’s industrial economy in ways Russia never experienced.

Democratic Constraints vs. Authoritarian Capacity

Putin could impose economic hardship on Russians without facing electoral consequences. Modi cannot. India’s democratic system—whatever its recent strains—means that voters punish governments for economic distress. A sanctions-triggered recession would end political careers.

This creates a structural constraint on military adventurism that Russia does not face. The BJP’s political survival depends on economic performance; a war that crashes the economy is politically suicidal.

The Three-Front Reality

Russia faced NATO expansion as its primary security concern, with no equivalent pressure on other borders. India faces simultaneous threats from China and Pakistan—nuclear-armed adversaries who would exploit any Indian military commitment elsewhere.

The three-front trap is not hypothetical. Pentagon assessments confirm China-Pakistan operational coordination. Any Indian action against Bangladesh automatically invites pressure on two other fronts India cannot afford to weaken.

What India Will Do Instead: The Destabilization Toolkit

If invasion is off the table, what should Bangladesh expect? History and current patterns suggest India will rely on a sophisticated destabilization toolkit that operates below the threshold of conventional military conflict.

1. Intelligence Operations and Political Subversion

India’s primary instrument for influencing Bangladesh has always been intelligence penetration rather than military force. This includes:

Institutional Infiltration: Credible reports suggest deep RAW penetration of Bangladesh’s military intelligence, civilian agencies, media organizations, and political parties. The phrase “RAW ka agent” exists in Dhaka’s political vocabulary for a reason.

Political Cultivation: India maintains relationships across Bangladesh’s political spectrum, ensuring influence regardless of which party holds power. This includes funding, intelligence sharing, and political coordination.

Elite Capture: Key decision-makers in business, bureaucracy, and civil society develop dependencies on Indian relationships that constrain their policy positions.

Strategic Objective: Ensure that any Bangladeshi government remains within acceptable parameters for New Delhi, without requiring overt intervention.

2. Economic Coercion and Trade Weaponization

India has demonstrated willingness to use economic pressure against smaller neighbors. The 2015 Nepal blockade—which triggered fuel and medicine shortages—showed New Delhi’s capacity for economic warfare.

Against Bangladesh, potential instruments include:

Transit and Trade Disruption: Restricting transit agreements, creating customs bottlenecks, or imposing informal trade barriers at land ports.

Water Weaponization: Manipulating shared river flows during critical agricultural seasons. The Farakka Barrage already gives India structural leverage over Bangladesh’s water security.

Investment Pressure: Encouraging Indian businesses to withdraw or reduce investment, while pressuring third-country investors against Bangladesh engagement.

Labor Market Coercion: India hosts significant Bangladeshi informal workers. Crackdowns or deportations could create domestic pressure on Dhaka.

3. Proxy Mobilization and Non-State Actors

India has historically leveraged ethnic and political grievances in neighboring states. In Bangladesh’s context, this could include:

Hindu Minority Instrumentalization: Amplifying minority grievance narratives internationally to delegitimize Bangladesh’s government and create diplomatic pressure.

Political Opposition Support: Providing sanctuary, funding, and logistical support to opposition figures—as the current sanctuary crisis demonstrates.

Civil Society Cultivation: Funding NGOs, media outlets, and think tanks that advance India-aligned narratives while appearing independent.

Insurgency Support: In extremis, providing covert support to destabilizing movements within Bangladesh.

4. Information and Narrative Warfare

India’s approach to the Hadi assassination narrative reveals sophisticated information warfare capabilities:

Deflection Narratives: Creating alternative explanations for events that might generate anti-India sentiment—as seen with “internal Islamist conflict” framing.

International Agenda-Setting: Using India’s larger diplomatic presence and media reach to shape how international audiences perceive Bangladesh.

Social Media Manipulation: Coordinated inauthentic behavior to amplify preferred narratives and suppress critical voices.

Academic and Think Tank Influence: Shaping the analytical frameworks through which international policy communities understand Bangladesh.

The Maximum Escalation Scenario: Limited Strikes

If India’s destabilization efforts fail or Bangladesh pursues policies that New Delhi considers existentially threatening, the maximum likely escalation is limited surgical strikes—not invasion or occupation.

The Domestic Politics Driver

Strategic necessity is not the only trigger for limited strikes. Electoral calculations may be the primary driver. The Balakot precedent is instructive: India’s 2019 airstrikes against Pakistan came weeks before general elections, allowing the BJP to campaign on muscular nationalism. Independent analysts questioned whether the strikes achieved any significant military objective—but they achieved their political objective decisively.

For Indian domestic audiences, Bangladesh represents an even softer target than Pakistan:

• No nuclear deterrent to constrain escalation
• “Illegal immigrant” narrative already primed in Indian political discourse
• Hindu minority framing provides ready-made justification
• Weaker international consequences than striking a nuclear-armed state

A BJP government facing electoral headwinds could calculate that strikes against Bangladesh offer high domestic political returns with lower strategic risk than confronting Pakistan or China. The threshold for such strikes is not Bangladesh’s behavior but India’s electoral calendar.

This makes limited strikes simultaneously less likely (no genuine strategic necessity) and more dangerous (political logic is unpredictable). Bangladesh cannot deter electoral calculations the way it might deter strategic ones—a nationalist politician seeking votes does not weigh costs and benefits rationally.

What Limited Strikes Might Look Like

Targeted Airstrikes: Precision attacks against specific military installations, intelligence facilities, or infrastructure—similar to Israel’s operations against hostile neighbors or India’s own 2019 Balakot strike against Pakistan.

Cross-Border Special Operations: Commando raids targeting specific individuals or facilities, with plausible deniability or manufactured justification.

Cyber and Electronic Warfare: Disabling critical infrastructure (power grids, communications, financial systems) without kinetic action.

Naval Demonstration: Blockade threats or show-of-force operations in the Bay of Bengal to coerce policy changes.

Why Occupation Is Off the Table

Even limited strikes carry significant escalation risks, but territorial occupation is categorically different. Occupying Bangladesh would require:

• Sustained military commitment when India faces China-Pakistan threats
• Governing 170 million hostile people with no collaborative elite (unlike 1971)
• International isolation including likely sanctions from Western and Gulf partners
• Domestic political disaster as Indian soldiers die in an unpopular occupation

None of these costs make strategic sense. India’s objective is a compliant Bangladesh, not a conquered one. Compliance is achieved more efficiently through destabilization than occupation.

The Balakot Precedent: Politics Over Strategy

India’s 2019 Balakot airstrike against Pakistan provides the template—and the warning. Despite government claims of killing “hundreds of terrorists,” independent investigations found the bombs hit empty hillside. The operation achieved no meaningful military objective.

But it achieved its political objective spectacularly. The BJP swept the 2019 elections weeks later, with “surgical strike” nationalism as a central campaign theme. The lesson for Indian politicians was clear: strikes against Muslim-majority neighbors generate domestic political dividends regardless of military effectiveness.

Against Bangladesh, similar logic would apply—but with lower risks:

• Pakistan retaliated with its own airstrikes and shot down an Indian aircraft; Bangladesh lacks comparable response capability
• Nuclear escalation constrained India against Pakistan; no such constraint exists with Bangladesh
• International attention focused on India-Pakistan nuclear dynamics; Bangladesh crisis would generate less scrutiny

This creates a dangerous asymmetry: strikes against Bangladesh offer similar domestic political benefits with fewer strategic costs. A future Indian government seeking electoral boost may view Bangladesh as the path of least resistance.

Strategic Implications for Bangladesh

Understanding that India will pursue destabilization rather than invasion requires different defensive preparations than conventional military buildup alone.

1. Counter-Intelligence Priority

If intelligence penetration is India’s primary instrument, counter-intelligence must be Bangladesh’s primary defense. This means:

• Institutional reform to identify and remove compromised personnel
• Technical capabilities for secure communications and cyber defense
• Vetting systems for sensitive positions in government, military, and intelligence
• Cultivation of genuine allies within India’s own system

2. Economic Resilience

Reducing vulnerability to economic coercion requires:

• Trade diversification away from Indian dependence
• Alternative transit routes through Myanmar and maritime connections
• Water security investments including storage, efficiency, and international legal frameworks
• Reserve accumulation to weather short-term economic pressure

3. Information Sovereignty

Countering narrative warfare requires:

• Independent media capacity that cannot be captured by foreign interests
• International communications capability to contest India’s narrative dominance
• Civil society independence through transparent funding and governance
• Academic institutions that produce Bangladesh-centered analysis

4. Minimum Credible Deterrent

While invasion is unlikely, limited strikes become more likely if Bangladesh appears completely defenseless. Minimum deterrent capability means:

• Air defense systems that impose costs on airstrikes
• Anti-ship and coastal defense that complicate naval coercion
• Cyber retaliation capability that threatens Indian infrastructure
• Strategic partnerships (China, Pakistan, Turkey) that raise escalation risks for India

The objective is not to defeat India militarily—impossible given the power differential—but to ensure that even limited strikes carry costs New Delhi prefers to avoid.

This Issue Brief represents the analysis of the Inqilab Delta Forum research team.

Citation: Inqilab Delta Forum. “India Is Not Russia: Why the Ukraine Playbook Won’t Apply to Bangladesh.” Issue Brief, Bay of Bengal Security Initiative, December 2025.

Related Analysis:

• Why India Won’t Launch a Full-Scale Attack on Bangladesh
• India’s Economic Achilles Heel
• The Three-Front Trap
• The Sanctuary Dilemma