Key Findings
- India’s destabilization tactics in Bangladesh threaten to reverse decades of security cooperation that pacified Northeast insurgencies
- The Kuki-Chin ethnic networks spanning CHT, Manipur, Mizoram, and Myanmar can flow in both directions—what India allegedly supports today could target India tomorrow
- Bangladesh dismantled ULFA camps and extradited insurgent leaders during Hasina’s tenure; a hostile Dhaka has no incentive to continue this cooperation
- The Siliguri Corridor—India’s “Chicken’s Neck” connecting the Northeast to the mainland—becomes strategically vulnerable if Bangladesh-India relations collapse
- Short-term destabilization creates long-term security nightmares that no amount of military spending can resolve
On December 15, 2024, Hasnat Abdullah—a leader of Bangladesh’s National Citizen Party—issued a warning that should have alarmed strategic planners in New Delhi: “Since you are housing those who destabilize us, we will give refuge to the separatists of seven sisters too.”
The statement was inflammatory, perhaps reckless. But it illuminated a fundamental truth that India’s current Bangladesh policy ignores: destabilization is a game two can play, and India has far more to lose.
The Forgotten Bargain
For fifteen years under Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh served as India’s most reliable security partner in the region. This was not altruism—it was a strategic bargain. In exchange for India’s support of her increasingly authoritarian rule, Hasina delivered something invaluable: the systematic dismantling of anti-India insurgent networks operating from Bangladeshi soil.
The results were substantial:
| Insurgent Group | Bangladesh Action | Impact on India |
|---|---|---|
| ULFA | Camps dismantled; leaders extradited | Assam insurgency significantly weakened |
| NSCN factions | Transit routes disrupted | Nagaland violence reduced |
| Bodo militants | Safe havens eliminated | BTAD region stabilized |
| Multiple NE groups | Intelligence sharing established | Preemptive operations enabled |
The 2024 Tripura Peace Accord—ending a 35-year insurgency—was only possible because Bangladesh had systematically denied sanctuary to militants. When the last 328 NLFT and ATTF fighters surrendered, it marked the culmination of Indo-Bangladesh security cooperation.
That cooperation ended on August 5, 2024, when Hasina fled to India.
The Chittagong Calculation
Reports of Indian involvement in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts have circulated for years. The Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF)—a separatist movement seeking autonomy for ethnic Kuki-Chin peoples in Bandarban and Rangamati—has documented connections to militant networks in India’s Manipur.
The ethnic geography is significant: Kuki-Chin peoples inhabit a contiguous zone spanning:
- Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts
- India’s Manipur and Mizoram states
- Myanmar’s Chin State
In the first batch of KNF fighters, over a hundred members were reportedly sent to Manipur for training. The collaboration continues—in March 2024, India’s Assam Rifles detained two Kuki-Chin National Army members in Mizoram.
The May 2025 Seizure
If India believes it can support separatism in Bangladesh’s southeast without consequence, it fundamentally misunderstands the dynamics it is unleashing.
The Boomerang Trajectory
The same ethnic networks that allegedly channel support to KNF can reverse direction. Consider the arithmetic:
What India gains from CHT destabilization:
- Pressure on Bangladesh’s interim government
- Leverage in bilateral negotiations
- Potential territorial fragmentation of a neighbor
What India risks:
- Revival of ULFA-Independent, which released joint statements with NSCN factions in 2025 calling for strikes across the Northeast
- Loss of intelligence cooperation that enables preemptive operations
- A hostile Bangladesh providing sanctuary, training, and transit to anti-India insurgents
- Potential coordination between Bangladeshi, Myanmarese, and Northeast Indian ethnic militants
The insurgencies that consumed India’s Northeast for decades were never fully defeated—they were contained through a combination of military pressure, political accommodation, and crucially, Bangladesh’s cooperation. Remove that cooperation, and the containment unravels.
The Siliguri Vulnerability
India’s strategic planners understand the Siliguri Corridor problem intimately. This narrow strip of territory—barely 22 kilometers wide at its narrowest point—connects India’s seven northeastern states to the mainland. It is bordered by Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan.
During the decades of active insurgency, militants exploited this geographic vulnerability relentlessly. The corridor can be interdicted, infiltrated, or simply threatened in ways that impose enormous costs on India’s ability to project power in its own territory.
Abdullah’s reference to the “seven sisters” was not geographically ignorant—it was strategically pointed. A Bangladesh that actively supports Northeast insurgents could:
- Provide sanctuary for militant leadership and training camps
- Enable transit for weapons, fighters, and supplies
- Offer intelligence on Indian military deployments and vulnerabilities
- Coordinate operations across the porous border
None of this requires Bangladesh to formally support insurgency. Mere tolerance—the withdrawal of active suppression—would suffice to transform India’s security environment.
The Strategic Inversion
The irony is profound. India’s alleged destabilization strategy in Bangladesh is designed to weaken a neighbor that New Delhi perceives as drifting from its orbit. But the strategy guarantees the very outcome it seeks to prevent.
A destabilized Bangladesh:
- Cannot serve as a security partner against Northeast insurgents
- Has every incentive to reciprocate destabilization
- Will accelerate its pivot toward China and Pakistan for security guarantees
- Provides a failed-state environment where multiple actors—including those hostile to India—can operate
A stable, prosperous Bangladesh with normalized relations:
- Continues security cooperation in mutual interest
- Provides a growing market for Indian goods
- Serves as a buffer against Chinese encirclement
- Maintains the territorial integrity that protects India’s eastern flank
India’s current approach inverts this logic entirely.
The Historical Lesson
Pakistan learned this lesson in Afghanistan. For decades, Islamabad believed it could use militant proxies as instruments of strategic depth—supporting groups that would serve Pakistani interests in Kabul while remaining controllable. The result was the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which turned the same networks, training, and ideology against the Pakistani state itself.
The “strategic depth” doctrine produced not security but perpetual insecurity—a lesson written in the blood of tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians and soldiers.
India appears determined to repeat this error on its eastern flank. The militants being cultivated today, the separatist networks being tolerated or encouraged, the destabilization being pursued—all of it can reverse direction. The boomerang always returns.
The Bottom Line
This Delta Dispatch represents the analysis of the Inqilab Delta Forum research team.