ISSUE BRIEF
South Asia Security Program

Surgical Strikes and Electoral Dividends: India's Limited War Doctrine as Political Theater

Examining the gap between military effectiveness and political utility in India's cross-border operations against Pakistan

Inqilab Delta Forum | South Asia Security Program | December 25, 2025

Key Findings

On the night of May 7, 2025, Indian warplanes and cruise missiles struck nine targets across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in what New Delhi termed “Operation Sindoor”—the most extensive cross-border military action since the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. Within hours, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) began distributing campaign pamphlets featuring Prime Minister Narendra Modi with fighter jets, branding the operation as “determination against terrorism.”

This was not an anomaly. It was the latest iteration of a pattern that has defined India-Pakistan relations under BJP rule: limited military strikes against Pakistan, followed by aggressive domestic political exploitation, regardless of actual military effectiveness.

This Issue Brief examines three cases of India’s “limited strikes” doctrine—the 2016 surgical strikes, the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, and the 2025 Operation Sindoor—analyzing the gap between claimed military objectives and political utility, and assessing whether these operations constitute strategic policy or electoral theater.

The 2016 “Surgical Strikes”: Creating the Template

The Uri Attack and Response

On September 18, 2016, four militants attacked an Indian Army base at Uri in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 19 soldiers. The attack occurred as the BJP faced important regional elections and intense public pressure to respond militarily.

Eleven days later, on September 29, Indian Army special forces conducted what the government called “surgical strikes”—ground incursions 1-3 kilometers into Pakistan-administered Kashmir targeting militant launch pads. The Director General of Military Operations announced that “a significant number of terrorists and those who were trying to support them” had been neutralized.

The Claims vs. Reality Gap

Indian Government Claims:

Pakistan’s Position:

Independent Analysis:

The credibility gap was immediate and significant. As India’s own former Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon noted, such operations “had not been publicized before, because they were not aimed at the domestic constituency.”

Defense commentator Mohan Guruswamy called the BJP government’s insistence on the term “surgical strike” an act of “political charlatanism.” Given that the operations were shallow, involved no airpower, and achieved limited penetration, analysts preferred terms like “border raids” or “modified hot pursuit.”

Crucially, no photographic evidence, casualty documentation, or independent verification was provided. Being in an age of ubiquitous surveillance, the absence of evidence became evidence of absence.

Academic Assessment: Securitization Theater

Dr. Saloni Kapur’s 2018 analysis in Global Discourse characterizes the 2016 operation as “securitization in two acts”—a phrase with contestable meaning designed primarily for domestic political consumption rather than strategic military effect. The Foreign Secretary in the previous Congress government explicitly stated such operations were not publicized previously because they were not “aimed at the domestic constituency.”

Electoral Impact: The Proof of Intent

The 2016 strikes occurred weeks before crucial state elections. Post-strike polling showed:

The domestic political payoff was undeniable. The military effectiveness remained unproven.

The 2019 Balakot Airstrikes: Escalation and Falsification

The Pulwama Attack

On February 14, 2019, a vehicle-borne suicide bomber attacked a convoy in Pulwama, killing 46 Central Reserve Police Force personnel. The attack was claimed by Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed. India stood weeks away from general elections, with Modi facing challenges over economic performance and rural distress.

The Response: Crossing New Thresholds

On February 26, 2019, Indian Air Force Mirage 2000 jets crossed into Pakistani airspace and dropped Israeli SPICE-2000 smart bombs on targets near Balakot, marking the first time Indian aircraft had struck inside Pakistan proper since the 1971 war—a threshold crossing between nuclear-armed states without precedent.

The Claims: Spectacular Success

The Indian government and BJP leaders made extraordinary claims:

The Reality: Comprehensive Debunking

Within days, multiple independent investigations demolished these claims:

Satellite Imagery Analysis (Reuters, March 2019):

Expert Assessment: Jeffrey Lewis (Middlebury Institute of International Studies): “The high-resolution images don’t show any evidence of bomb damage.”

Australian Strategic Policy Institute Analysis: Satellite imagery showed “all three weapons missed by similar distances,” suggesting “a systematic targeting error.”

On-the-Ground Reporting: Reuters journalists visiting Balakot found four craters in wooded slopes and splintered trees, but no destroyed buildings and no casualties. Local residents stated: “No one died. Only some pine trees died.”

Indian Government Admission: In April 2019, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj officially stated that “no Pakistani soldier or civilian was hurt in Balakot air raids.”

The Indian government’s casualty claims were not exaggerated—they were fabricated.

The Gap Between Claim and Reality

Claim Independent Verification
250+ terrorists killed Zero confirmed casualties
Training camps destroyed All structures intact per satellite imagery
Precision strike on targets Weapons missed targets (systematic error)
Major blow to militant infrastructure No operational impact on militant groups

The Aftermath: Escalation and Losses

Pakistan retaliated the following day, shooting down an Indian MiG-21 and capturing pilot Abhinandan Varthaman. In the confusion, Indian air defense shot down its own Mi-17 helicopter, killing six airmen and one civilian.

India came perilously close to a wider war, with both nuclear-armed states mobilizing forces. Only international mediation and Pakistan’s decision to return the captured pilot defused the crisis.

Electoral Impact: Mission Accomplished

Despite the verifiable failure of military claims, the political payoff was enormous:

Polling Data (CSDS National Election Study 2019):

Electoral Results: The BJP won 303 seats in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, improving on its 2014 performance despite economic headwinds.

Academic analysis by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies concluded: “The Pulwama attack and the Balakot strike in particular, and a national security crisis in general, contributed to the BJP’s massive 2019 Lok Sabha victory.”

The strikes failed militarily but succeeded electorally—revealing their true purpose.

Operation Sindoor (2025): Doctrine Matures, Risks Escalate

The Pahalgam Attack

On April 22, 2025, five armed terrorists attacked Hindu tourists near Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 26 civilians in targeted executions. The attack was calculated for maximum provocation, selectively targeting Hindu men for point-blank execution.

The Response: Unprecedented Scale

On May 7, 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor—a tri-service operation using air-launched missiles, cruise missiles, and loitering munitions to strike nine sites across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The operation represented a significant escalation in scope and capability:

Targets Struck:

Weapons Systems:

The Conflict: Four Days of Near-War

Unlike 2016 and 2019, Pakistan responded with sustained military action:

Casualty Claims: The Familiar Pattern

Indian Claims:

Pakistani Claims:

Independent Assessment: As of this writing, independent verification remains limited. However, the pattern of inflated claims followed by contradictory evidence suggests caution in accepting official narratives at face value.

Strategic Analysis: Evolution or Escalation?

War on the Rocks analysis (May 2025) noted: “Operation Sindoor took the 2019 Balakot evolution further—India struck a larger set of initial targets, with more force, and more types of weapons. The 2019 Balakot strike validated for Indian decision-makers the notion that they could use military force to punish Pakistan without triggering a war or nuclear retaliation.”

But did it? The four-day conflict, aircraft losses, and requirement for international mediation suggest India’s calculation of Pakistan’s threshold for escalation may be dangerously optimistic.

The Escalation Ladder

Each iteration has moved India-Pakistan conflict up the escalation ladder:

  • 2016: Ground-based special forces raids
  • 2019: Airstrikes inside Pakistan proper, Pakistani counter-strike, captured pilot
  • 2025: Multi-domain strikes, sustained four-day conflict, aircraft losses both sides

The stability-instability paradox suggests that while nuclear weapons deter all-out war, they may encourage limited conflicts. But each “limited” conflict creates opportunities for miscalculation, technical failure, or nationalist pressure that could trigger catastrophic escalation.

Electoral Weaponization: The Pattern Continues

The BJP immediately leveraged Operation Sindoor for upcoming state elections:

Campaign Activities:

Opposition Response: West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee accused Modi of engaging in the “business of Sindoor.” CPI(ML) Liberation Secretary Dipankar Bhattacharya accused the BJP of “trying to derive electoral benefits from Operation Sindoor.”

Public Reception: Unlike 2016 and 2019, public response appeared more muted. Modi’s roadshow in Patna received a notably poor response. Massive protests arose from women’s groups objecting to sindoor distribution campaigns as encroachment on Hindu traditions.

The diminishing returns suggest voters may be developing immunity to the “rally ‘round the flag” effect.

Academic Analysis: Military Theater or Strategic Policy?

The Carnegie Endowment Assessment

Analysts George Perkovich and Toby Dalton provide perhaps the most damning academic critique in their Carnegie Endowment work Not War, Not Peace?:

“Both India’s 2016 surgical strikes and 2019 Balakot airstrike were departures from the orthodox offensive doctrine—they used small force packages, eschewing the major ground formations that would have triggered a war—but both also revealed the limitations of the logic of punitive retaliation. They were more important as signals of Indian political resolve and dangerous appetite for risk rather than as an effective cost-imposition strategy and achieved negligible operational effects on the targeted terrorist networks.”

The researchers note that “Indian scholars offer relatively few ideas about exactly how and why limited conventional operations on Pakistani territory would motivate Pakistani authorities to change their policy.”

Well-informed Indian civilian experts doubt the feasibility: “There is no theory of how Cold Start or any other military action would compel the Pakistanis to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure.”

The Stimson Center Warning

Stimson Center analyst Khurshid Khan concluded that “any Indian attempt to wage a limited war against Pakistan would inevitably escalate to an all-out conventional war and increase the chances of a nuclear exchange.”

Khan identifies escalation drivers:

The stability-instability paradox creates a dangerous dynamic: because both sides believe nuclear weapons prevent total war, they may be more willing to engage in limited conflicts—increasing the risk of miscalculation leading to catastrophe.

Academic legal analysis (Nabarun Roy, 2024) finds “the argument regarding the weakness of India’s legal position to be more convincing,” noting that political considerations and incentive structures drive decision-making more than legal frameworks or strategic logic.

Dr. B. Desai’s analysis in Economic and Political Weekly (2017) critiques India’s invocation of self-defense justifications as legally questionable, particularly given the absence of evidence linking specific attacks to Pakistani state actors versus non-state militants.

The Diversionary War Theory: A Framework for Understanding

Core Concept

Political scientists have long studied what they term “diversionary war theory”—the proposition that leaders threatened by domestic political troubles may initiate international conflicts to improve their standing by triggering the “rally ‘round the flag” effect.

The theory posits two primary mechanisms:

  1. Rally ‘Round the Flag: External threats strengthen in-group/out-group biases, increasing support for national leadership
  2. Gambling for Resurrection: Leaders already facing probable defeat have little to lose and much to gain from risky conflicts

Benefits for Leaders

Diversionary foreign policy offers embattled leaders four potential benefits:

Empirical Evidence: Mixed But Suggestive

While empirical support for diversionary war theory remains contested, several factors make it particularly applicable to India-Pakistan cases:

Territorial Diversion Variant: Research suggests diversionary tactics are most effective when involving territorial disputes, as “people tend to react to territorial issues intensely.” Kashmir fits this profile perfectly.

Effectiveness as Strategy: Studies show diversionary force is “less suited to quelling domestic unrest than domestic policies that address the economy.” This explains why the effect may be diminishing—economic problems remain unaddressed.

Application to India’s Limited Strikes

The pattern fits the diversionary war framework remarkably well:

Operation Domestic Context Political Outcome
2016 Surgical Strikes Upcoming state elections, questions about border security BJP wins state elections, Modi approval rises
2019 Balakot General elections, economic headwinds, rural distress BJP wins 303 seats despite economic problems
2025 Sindoor Upcoming Bihar/Bengal/Assam elections, opposition unity challenges TBD—diminishing returns evident

Each operation occurred in proximity to elections. Each diverted attention from economic or governance challenges. Each triggered measurable polling benefits.

BJP’s Electoral Weaponization of Military Operations

The Kargil Precedent (1999)

The BJP’s systematic exploitation of cross-border conflicts for electoral gain predates Modi. During the 1999 Kargil War, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s popularity increased 9.6 percentage points, with 63.5% expressing satisfaction with his war handling. The BJP returned to power in subsequent elections.

This established the template: military confrontation with Pakistan yields electoral dividends.

The 2019 Case Study: Nationalism as “Bridging Issue”

Academic analysis identifies nationalism as a “bridging issue”—it allows parties to mobilize new voters without displeasing the core support base.

CSDS Research Findings:

Regional Variation: The effectiveness varied significantly by region:

This variation suggests the electoral impact is not uniform but particularly effective in BJP’s Hindi belt strongholds.

The 2024 Counterexample: Limits of the Strategy

The 2024 general election provides a crucial counterpoint. Despite the BJP’s continued emphasis on Hindu nationalism, including Modi’s January 2024 Ram temple inauguration in Ayodhya, the party fell short of majority:

Results:

Voter Priorities Shifted:

The 2024 results suggest limits to nationalism as an electoral strategy—it works most effectively when coupled with immediate military operations, not as a sustained governing ideology.

Operation Sindoor and the 2025-2026 Elections

The BJP’s approach to Operation Sindoor reveals the calculus:

Targeted States:

Campaign Strategy:

Early Indicators:

The question is whether Indian voters have developed resistance to the formula.

The Strategic Incoherence: Means Without Theory

Perhaps the most damning critique of India’s limited strikes doctrine is the absence of a coherent theory of victory.

Carnegie’s analysis identifies the fundamental problem: “Indian scholars offer relatively few ideas about exactly how and why limited conventional operations on Pakistani territory would motivate Pakistani authorities to change their policy.”

The logic chain breaks down:

  1. ✓ India conducts limited strikes
  2. ✓ India inflicts some damage (contested extent)
  3. ? Pakistan is motivated to change behavior
  4. ? Cross-border terrorism decreases

Steps 3 and 4 have no supporting evidence. In fact, evidence suggests the opposite:

Post-2016: No measurable decrease in cross-border infiltration or attacks Post-2019: Pulwama-level attacks continue (leading to Pahalgam 2025) Post-2025: TBD, but pattern suggests continued militant activity

The Pakistan Calculus

Why would limited strikes change Pakistani behavior? The strikes:

As Stimson’s analysis notes, even if Pakistani leaders wanted to rein in militant groups, “it is far from given that Pakistani leaders are able to control militant groups.”

The Actual Effect: Escalation Without Resolution

Rather than compelling Pakistani policy change, the strikes create escalatory dynamics:

Pakistani Response:

Regional Instability:

The strikes make the problem they purport to solve objectively worse.

The Nuclear Shadow: Playing with Fire

The Threshold Question

Pakistan has explicitly stated it will use nuclear weapons if its survival is threatened. But where exactly is that threshold?

Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture:

Indian Gamble: Each operation tests where Pakistan’s red line actually is. The assumption is that limited strikes remain below the nuclear threshold.

The Rafale Precedent: Technology Failure

Operation Sindoor demonstrated a troubling development: the reported downing of an Indian Rafale jet by Pakistani/Chinese air defense systems.

Western analysts expressed concern that this raises questions about Western military technology assumptions. The Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung noted the operation “appeared to have turned into a disaster.”

If India’s technological superiority is less decisive than assumed, the confidence in executing “limited” strikes without escalation may be misplaced.

The Stability-Instability Paradox

Nuclear theorists identify the “stability-instability paradox”:

Each “successful” limited strike reinforces Indian confidence that Pakistan won’t escalate to nuclear use. But cumulative provocations, nationalist pressures, and potential miscalculation create compound escalation risks.

As one Pakistani analyst noted after Sindoor, Pakistan came out “emboldened,” with the military more popular and the country unified. This is the opposite of the deterrent effect India claims to seek.

Conclusions: Political Theater in Nuclear Shadow

The evidence across three iterations of India’s limited strikes doctrine (2016, 2019, 2025) reveals a consistent pattern:

Military Effectiveness: Questionable to Non-Existent

No credible evidence suggests these operations have reduced cross-border terrorism, changed Pakistani policy, or achieved strategic objectives.

Political Effectiveness: Proven but Diminishing

The electoral payoff is undeniable in 2016 and 2019, suggesting political rather than military logic drives decision-making. However, diminishing returns in 2025 suggest voters may be developing resistance.

Academic Assessment: Signals Over Strategy

Carnegie Endowment’s verdict is definitive: strikes are “more important as signals of Indian political resolve and dangerous appetite for risk rather than as an effective cost-imposition strategy.”

The operations achieve “negligible operational effects on targeted terrorist networks” while “contributing to India’s insecurity” through escalatory dynamics and Pakistani nuclear force expansion.

Diversionary War Framework: Strong Fit

The pattern aligns closely with diversionary war theory:

While diversionary war theory has mixed empirical support generally, the India-Pakistan case provides one of the clearest examples of the phenomenon in contemporary international relations.

Strategic Incoherence: Means Without Theory

The fundamental problem remains: there is no plausible theory of victory.

Limited strikes do not and cannot compel Pakistan to dismantle militant infrastructure. Pakistani leaders may lack the capacity even if they had the will. The strikes strengthen rather than weaken the Pakistani military’s domestic position.

Indian decision-makers have adopted a doctrine with tactical sophistication but strategic incoherence—military operations that serve political theater rather than national security.

Nuclear Risks: Compounding with Each Iteration

Perhaps most troublingly, each operation moves India and Pakistan further up the escalation ladder:

The confidence that limited strikes can remain below the nuclear threshold may be the most dangerous assumption of all.

Why Bangladesh Should Care: The Pattern’s Next Target

While this analysis has focused on India-Pakistan dynamics, the implications for Bangladesh are direct and urgent. Understanding India’s limited strikes doctrine is not academic—it reveals the playbook that may be applied to Bangladesh.

Bangladesh as the Softer Alternative

As documented in our analysis “The Authoritarian Trajectory,” the BJP faces a fundamental problem: it has spent a decade manufacturing rage against Pakistan and China, but nuclear deterrence makes genuine conflict with either nation existentially dangerous.

The limited strikes pattern reveals this trap in action:

Why the Pattern Matters for Bangladesh

Bangladesh presents what Indian strategists may view as a “permissive environment” for limited operations:

Military Asymmetry:

Political Utility:

Lower International Costs:

The Electoral Calendar Connection

The surgical strikes pattern shows operations cluster around elections:

Bangladesh faces its own electoral timeline (February 2026) while India’s West Bengal elections (2026) create incentive windows. The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty expiration (December 12, 2026) provides additional crisis opportunities.

What Limited Strikes Against Bangladesh Might Look Like

Based on the India-Pakistan pattern, potential scenarios include:

Cross-Border Strikes:

Hot Pursuit Incursions:

Territorial Seizure:

The False Claims Precedent

The surgical strikes analysis reveals a crucial pattern: Indian governments make extraordinary claims that subsequent investigation proves false.

2019 Balakot:

What This Means for Bangladesh: If India conducts operations against Bangladesh, expect:

  1. Immediate claims of “successful strikes” on “terrorist infrastructure”
  2. Extraordinary casualty/damage claims for domestic consumption
  3. Evidence that contradicts official narrative (if international verification possible)
  4. Electoral exploitation regardless of actual military effectiveness

Bangladesh must prepare for operations designed for Indian domestic politics rather than genuine security objectives—making them both more likely (lower threshold) and more dangerous (no strategic logic constrains them).

Strategic Preparation

Understanding the limited strikes pattern allows Bangladesh to prepare:

  1. Anticipate Electoral Timing: Monitor Indian election calendars for high-risk windows
  2. Counter the Narrative: Pre-emptively rebut “Hindu persecution” fabrications
  3. International Verification: Ensure mechanisms exist to document any Indian operations independently
  4. Asymmetric Deterrence: Not matching Indian military power, but raising costs to make operations irrational
  5. Three-Front Coordination: Deepening China-Pakistan ties creates restraint on Indian adventurism

The Bottom Line for Bangladesh

India’s limited strikes doctrine is political theater masquerading as strategy. The operations achieve negligible military effects but provide measurable electoral dividends. For BJP leadership facing diminishing returns from Pakistan operations and unable to act against China, Bangladesh may increasingly appear as the target of choice.

This is not paranoia—it is pattern recognition. The same military infrastructure buildup, pretext construction, and rhetoric escalation documented in “The Soft Target” analysis is already underway.

Understanding how surgical strikes work—their political logic, electoral timing, and gap between claims and reality—is Bangladesh’s first line of defense.

Implications for Regional Stability and Democratic Accountability

For India

The limited strikes doctrine reveals a troubling subordination of strategic logic to electoral politics. When military operations are designed primarily for domestic political consumption rather than strategic effect, the risks compound:

  1. Erosion of Civil-Military Relations: Military operations become tools of political campaigns
  2. Strategic Drift: Lack of coherent theory of victory prevents actual security improvement
  3. International Credibility: False claims undermine India’s standing as a responsible power
  4. Nuclear Risks: Repeated threshold-testing creates compounding crisis risks

For Pakistan

Pakistani responses reveal their own pathologies:

For South Asia

The India-Pakistan cycle creates regional instability affecting 1.8 billion people:

For Democratic Accountability

Perhaps most concerning is what this pattern reveals about democratic accountability. When governments can fabricate casualty figures, manipulate nationalist sentiment, and face no political costs for false claims, democratic checks on military adventurism fail.

Indian media’s largely uncritical acceptance of government claims in 2016 and 2019—despite contrary evidence—represents a failure of the fourth estate. Only international investigations revealed the gaps between claims and reality.

The Fundamental Question

Are India’s limited strikes a coherent strategic doctrine aimed at compelling Pakistani policy change, or are they political theater designed for domestic electoral consumption?

The evidence overwhelmingly supports the latter. The operations are sophisticated military theater—tactically competent but strategically incoherent, designed to achieve polling gains rather than security objectives, and imposing escalatory risks on 1.8 billion people for the electoral benefit of one political party.

Recommendations

For Indian Civil Society and Media

  1. Demand Evidence: Claims of military casualties and infrastructure destruction should require verification
  2. Question Electoral Timing: Operations coinciding with elections warrant special scrutiny
  3. Independent Analysis: Develop capacity for independent military analysis rather than relying on government claims
  4. Democratic Accountability: Political exploitation of military operations should face electoral costs

For Pakistan

  1. Address Militant Infrastructure: Whatever India’s motivations, cross-border terrorism provides pretext for operations
  2. Crisis Management: Maintain and strengthen crisis communication mechanisms with India
  3. International Engagement: Multilateral frameworks can constrain unilateral actions

For International Community

  1. Crisis Prevention: Maintain pressure on both states to strengthen crisis management
  2. Verification Mechanisms: Independent monitoring of claims can reduce misinformation
  3. Nuclear Risk Reduction: Arms control initiatives remain vital given escalatory dynamics
  4. Economic Integration: Regional economic ties create incentives for stability

For Scholars and Analysts

  1. Document the Pattern: Systematic documentation of claims vs. evidence creates accountability
  2. Theory Development: Work on actual theories of compellence in South Asian context
  3. Public Education: Translate technical analysis for public consumption
  4. Alternative Frameworks: Develop security frameworks beyond military strikes

A Final Word: Sovereignty, Security, and Democratic Responsibility

The limited strikes doctrine represents a failure of strategic imagination—a belief that tactical military operations can substitute for genuine security policy. It reflects a political system where nationalist theater yields more electoral return than substantive governance.

For Bangladesh and other regional observers, the pattern offers lessons:

First, nuclear-armed states with democratic systems are not immune to the diversionary war temptation. Electoral incentives can override strategic logic.

Second, media ecosystems that uncritically accept government claims enable dangerous policies. Independent verification mechanisms are essential democratic infrastructure.

Third, the “rally ‘round the flag” effect has limits. Indian voters’ apparent resistance to Operation Sindoor exploitation in 2025 suggests democratic publics can develop immunity to manipulation.

Fourth, regional security requires addressing root causes rather than theatrical responses. As long as genuine grievances remain unaddressed and militant infrastructure persists, limited strikes will remain political theater rather than strategic policy.

The tragedy is that South Asia faces genuine security challenges—climate change, water scarcity, economic development, radicalization—that require cooperation rather than conflict. Resources devoted to limited military operations that achieve no strategic purpose are resources unavailable for actual challenges.

Until Indian decision-makers develop coherent theories of how military operations compel desired Pakistani behaviors, limited strikes will remain what Carnegie’s analysis identified: signals of political resolve rather than effective strategy, tactics in service of elections rather than security.

The question is whether Indian democracy can develop the accountability mechanisms to impose political costs on strategic incoherence before the escalatory dynamics create a crisis that neither side intends but both are powerless to prevent.

This Issue Brief represents the analysis of the Inqilab Delta Forum research team, based on comprehensive review of academic literature, independent media investigations, satellite imagery analysis, and expert assessments.

Citation: Inqilab Delta Forum. “Surgical Strikes and Electoral Dividends: India’s Limited War Doctrine as Political Theater.” Issue Brief, South Asia Security Program, December 2025.

Related Analysis:

Sources

2016 Surgical Strikes

2019 Balakot Airstrikes

Operation Sindoor (2025)

Academic and Strategic Analysis

Diversionary War Theory

BJP Electoral Impact

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