Key Findings
- Pakistan’s role in 1971 remains Bangladesh’s foundational trauma—any alignment requires confronting this history directly
- Nations frequently cooperate with former adversaries when interests align (France-Germany, Vietnam-USA, Egypt-Israel)
- Bangladesh’s 4,096-km border with India creates immediate costs for antagonizing New Delhi that Pakistan doesn’t face
- The core question: does India pose an existential threat that justifies cooperation with a historically painful partner?
The 1971 Legacy
Pakistan’s role in the 1971 Liberation War remains Bangladesh’s foundational historical trauma. The Pakistan military’s actions during that conflict resulted in mass atrocities that created Bangladesh as an independent nation. Any defense alignment with Pakistan requires confronting this history directly.
This does not make such alignment impossible—nations frequently cooperate with former adversaries when strategic interests align:
- France-Germany: Fought three devastating wars, now anchor of European integration
- Vietnam-USA: Decades of brutal conflict, now strategic partners against China
- Egypt-Israel: Multiple wars, now security cooperation
But such reconciliation requires:
- Public acknowledgment of historical grievances and their continued sensitivity
- Clear articulation of how current strategic imperatives differ from 1971 circumstances
- Transparent debate about whether strategic necessity justifies engagement with a nation responsible for historical wrongs
The India Proximity Challenge
Bangladesh shares a 4,096-kilometer border with India—one of the longest land boundaries in South Asia. This geographic reality imposes constraints that Pakistan (separated by Indian territory) does not face:
- Water sharing: India controls upstream flow of 54 transboundary rivers, including the Ganges, Teesta, and Brahmaputra
- Trade dependence: India accounts for significant bilateral trade, transit access, and economic integration
- Border security: Smuggling, migration, and border incidents require ongoing bilateral cooperation
Antagonizing India carries immediate, tangible costs that Pakistan does not bear. A defense alignment that triggers Indian economic retaliation or water weaponization could impose severe harm on Bangladesh’s economy and food security.
The China Alignment Question
Aligning with the China-Pakistan bloc means accepting Chinese strategic leadership. This raises legitimate questions:
- Debt sustainability: China’s infrastructure lending has created debt burdens for Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and other partners
- Strategic autonomy: Does integration into China’s security architecture constrain Bangladesh’s independent decision-making?
- U.S. and Western relations: How would Washington and Brussels respond to Bangladesh joining a Chinese-led security bloc?
- Divergent interests: China’s strategic priorities (Taiwan, South China Sea, Belt and Road) may not align with Bangladesh’s Bay of Bengal interests
Domestic Political Sensitivity
Defense alignment with Pakistan would face significant domestic opposition:
- Liberation War veteran organizations and their families
- Political parties that derive legitimacy from the 1971 independence struggle
- Civil society groups concerned about historical memory and national identity
- Public opinion shaped by 1971 narratives in education and media
Managing domestic politics is not merely a PR challenge—it represents a fundamental question about whether Bangladeshi society will accept this strategic pivot.
The Counterargument: Strategic Necessity vs Historical Grievance
The case for Pakistan alignment despite these risks rests on a hard calculation: Bangladesh’s sovereignty and territorial integrity may depend on counterbalancing India’s power, and Pakistan-China offers the only proven framework for doing so.
Consider the evidence:
- India’s treatment of smaller neighbors (Nepal’s 2015 blockade, Bhutan’s effective subordination)
- The existing China-Pakistan coordination framework that already constrains India
- Bangladesh’s isolation without strategic partners
If India’s regional influence strategy poses an existential threat to Bangladesh’s autonomy, then cooperation with Pakistan—however historically painful—becomes a matter of survival rather than preference.
India’s Self-Encirclement
The Pentagon assessment reveals a pattern: India’s regional influence strategy toward its neighbors has incentivized them to seek alternative security alignments, which constrains India’s strategic freedom of action.
Bangladesh did not create the China-Pakistan security bloc. By treating neighbors as subordinate actors rather than sovereign partners, New Delhi’s policies have systematically driven them toward Beijing and Islamabad as counterweight options.
For Bangladesh, this means the architecture for balancing India already exists rather than requiring construction from scratch. The question is whether Dhaka assesses the benefits as outweighing the substantial risks.
The Debate Bangladesh Must Have
This is not a question with an obvious answer. Both positions have merit:
For alignment: Strategic necessity may require uncomfortable partnerships. India’s power asymmetry leaves Bangladesh vulnerable without counterbalancing allies. The China-Pakistan framework exists and is proven.
Against alignment: Historical trauma cannot be dismissed as mere “politics.” Geographic proximity to India creates costs Pakistan doesn’t face. China alignment carries its own risks. Domestic consensus may be impossible.
What this dispatch argues: Bangladesh must have this debate honestly and transparently—not avoid it through strategic ambiguity or pretend the choice doesn’t exist. The constraints on India are real. The risks of alignment are real. The decision requires sober assessment of both.
The Bottom Line
Part of the Why India Won’t Launch a Full-Scale Attack on Bangladesh analysis series.