The Rohingya Burden: International Justice and the Politics of Refugee Return

The ICJ Case: Legal Struggle, Political Reality

In January 2020, The Gambia filed a case at the International Court of alleging that Myanmar’s military campaign against the Rohingya violated the Genocide Convention. Six years later, the case grinds on—and as 2026 begins, Bangladesh finds itself in a difficult position.

The Legal Proceedings

Where things stand: The ICJ is currently in the merits phase after rejecting Myanmar’s preliminary objections in 2022. Arguments on whether genocide occurred, whether Myanmar violated the Convention, and what remedies are appropriate will continue through 2026 and 2027, with a judgment expected in late 2027 or 2028.

Bangladesh’s role: While The Gambia is the formal plaintiff, Bangladesh provides evidence, testimony, and logistical support. The case is effectively funded and supported by a coalition of OIC countries, with Bangladesh as the primary stakeholder.

The Political Problem

The case has created a paradox for Bangladesh:

On one hand: Legal vindication that Myanmar committed genocide would strengthen Bangladesh’s position and create international obligations to address the crisis.

On the other: A verdict is years away, the genocide designation does not automatically create solutions, and the case gives Myanmar an excuse to delay—arguing that pending litigation makes cooperation premature.

International Media: The “Refugee Fatigue” Narrative

A noticeable shift has occurred in international coverage of the Rohingya crisis. Early coverage (2017-2020) focused on Myanmar atrocities. Increasingly, 2025-2026 coverage focuses on Bangladesh’s burden—and whether it can continue.

The New York Times: “The Camps That Became Cities”

A December 2025 feature painted Cox’s Bazar as a quasi-permanent city of nearly 1 million people with:

• A $60 million monthly operating cost
• Growing environmental degradation (deforestation, water depletion)
• Rising crime and insecurity within camps
• Tensions between refugees and host communities

The underlying message: Bangladesh cannot sustain this indefinitely. Something must give.

The Guardian: “Donor Fatigue and the Rohingya Crisis”

“Western donors, facing multiple global crises (Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan), are reducing contributions to Rohingya humanitarian operations. Bangladesh must accept that perfect is the enemy of good—and pursue repatriation even under imperfect conditions.”

Bangladesh’s response: Refugee protection is not a donor-dependent choice. It is a legal obligation. Donor fatigue does not justify refoulement (returning refugees to danger).

Reuters: “Myanmar’s Civil War and the Repatriation Impasse”

Detailed reporting on how Myanmar’s post-2021 conflict has made Rakhine State a war zone:

• The Arakan Army has seized control of much of northern Rakhine
• Junta forces conduct indiscriminate airstrikes
• Rohingya are caught between junta persecution and AA hostility
• Humanitarian access is virtually non-existent

Conclusion: Repatriation is not just politically difficult; it is physically impossible.

The China-ASEAN Push: Pressure on Bangladesh

The most significant international pressure on Bangladesh comes from an unexpected quarter: China and ASEAN, who want a repatriation framework that Bangladesh finds unacceptable.

The ASEAN Mechanism

ASEAN has led diplomatic efforts on Rohingya repatriation, culminating in the 2025 “Comprehensive Framework for Return.” Key elements:

• Pilot repatriation of 5,000 refugees to “reception centers”
• Joint monitoring by ASEAN, UNHCR, and Myanmar authorities
• Phased returns based on “verified safety”

Bangladesh’s objections:

1. The junta is a party to monitoring—compromising neutrality
2. “Verified safety” in Rakhine is currently impossible
3. No guarantees against renewed persecution
4. No clear path to citizenship or rights for returnees

China’s Role

China has pushed Bangladesh to accept the ASEAN framework, arguing:

• Prolonged refugee presence creates regional instability
• The international community will not fund camps indefinitely
• Some repatriation is better than none
• China can provide “assurances” from Myanmar

Dhaka’s response: China cannot provide safety guarantees when it doesn’t control the ground. Nor can Bangladesh trust assurances from a junta that has already committed genocide once.

The Western Split: Human Rights vs. Realism

Western countries are divided on how to approach the Rohingya crisis—and by extension, how to engage Bangladesh.

Camp 1: Human Rights Advocates

Led by European countries and human rights organizations, this camp argues:

• No repatriation to Myanmar under the junta
• Increased pressure on Myanmar through sanctions
• Expanded international funding for camps
• Alternative solutions (third-country resettlement, local integration)

Critique of Bangladesh: Should do more to protect refugees from camp conditions and crime.

Camp 2: Strategic Pragmatists

Led by some U.S. officials and Western diplomats, this camp argues:

• Realistically, refugees must eventually return
• Myanmar’s junta is the only authority to engage with
• Prolonged limbo serves no one
• Bangladesh should accept “manageable risks” for pilot returns

Critique of Bangladesh: Unrealistic expectations are making a bad situation worse.

The Result

Bangladesh receives contradictory advice:

• “Don’t return refugees to danger” (human rights advocates)
• “Start returning refugees” (strategic pragmatists)
• “Do more to help refugees” (donors)
• “Reduce donor dependency” (same donors, different department)

The incoherence allows everyone to blame Bangladesh for problems the international community created.

Myanmar’s Civil War: The New Complication

The biggest change since the Rohingya crisis began is Myanmar’s descent into civil war following the February 2021 coup. This has fundamentally altered the repatriation calculus.

Rakhine State Dynamics

The Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed organization seeking Rakhine autonomy, has emerged as the dominant force in northern Rakhine State. Their position toward Rohingya is complicated:

Historical hostility: The AA fought alongside Myanmar military against Rohingya in 2017.

Current position: AA leaders have expressed willingness to accept Rohingya return—but with conditions:

• Rohingya must support “Rakhine interests”
• Rohingya cannot claim territorial autonomy
• Rohingya must accept AA authority

For Rohingya: This means trading one oppressor (Myanmar military) for another (AA). It is not genuine safety.

The Junta’s Desperation

Myanmar’s military government, losing ground across the country, has made seemingly conciliatory offers:

• Accepting some Rohingya back for “verification”
• Offering “temporary stay” in reception centers
• Promising “review of citizenship cases”

Bangladesh’s assessment: These are public relations ploys, not genuine solutions. The junta wants to reduce international pressure, not resolve the crisis.

Bangladesh’s Domestic Politics

International pressure cannot be separated from Bangladesh’s internal dynamics:

Host Community Grievances

Residents of Cox’s Bazar and surrounding areas increasingly resent the refugee presence:

• Environmental degradation (deforestation, water scarcity)
• Wage depression (refugees work for lower wages)
• Security concerns (rising crime in camps)
• Perception that international aid benefits refugees more than hosts

The interim government cannot ignore these concerns without losing support in host communities.

Political Vulnerability

Any repatriation deal that goes wrong—returns that lead to persecution, violence against returnees that goes viral on social media—would be politically devastating. The opposition would accuse the government of “selling out” Rohingya for international approval.

Public Opinion

Bangladeshi public opinion remains broadly sympathetic to Rohingya but is shifting:

• 2020: 78% supported continued refuge (Survey by BRAC)
• 2023: 62% supported continued refuge
• 2025: 51% supported continued refuge

The trend line is moving toward “they should go home”—even if home isn’t safe.

What Bangladesh Is Actually Doing

Despite international pressure, Bangladesh has maintained a consistent position:

1. No Forced Returns

The interim government has repeatedly pledged not to forcibly repatriate anyone. This is non-negotiable and reflects both legal obligations (principle of non-refoulement) and domestic values.

2. Camp Condition Improvements

Efforts to address humanitarian concerns:

• Fire-resistant shelter upgrades
• Improved water and sanitation systems
• Educational programs for refugee children
• Livelihood training projects

3. International Advocacy

Bangladesh continues to raise the Rohingya issue at:

• UN General Assembly
• OIC summits
• Climate conferences (framing Rohingya as climate refugees)
• Human Rights Council

4. Documentation and Evidence

Systematic documentation of atrocities continues, supporting:

• The ICJ genocide case
• Universal jurisdiction cases in national courts (Argentina, Germany)
• Future accountability mechanisms

What International Media Is Missing

Coverage often misses several key points:

1. Bangladesh’s Magnitude of Burden

Few countries have hosted 1 million refugees for nearly a decade without significant international support. Bangladesh’s burden is extraordinary and under-acknowledged.

2. The Alternatives Problem

Critics offer no realistic alternatives. If not repatriation, then what?

• Third-country resettlement? Only 5,000 spots available globally.
• Local integration? Politically impossible in Bangladesh.
• Permanent camps? This is the de facto outcome, but no one will fund it properly.

3. The Justice-Solutions Link

There is a connection between accountability and solutions. Without justice for genocide, sustainable return is impossible. The ICJ case is not a distraction; it is central.

4. Regional Security Implications

Prolonged refugee presence creates security risks:

• Militant recruitment in camps
• Cross-border crime networks
• Tensions spilling into host communities

Ignoring these risks while demanding Bangladesh “do more” is unrealistic.

Scenarios for 2026

Scenario 1: Status Quo (Most Likely)

• No large-scale repatriation
• Continued donor funding but at reduced levels
• Growing host community tensions
• ICJ case continues without resolution
• International pressure on Bangladesh increases slowly

Scenario 2: ASEAN Breakthrough (Possible)

China brokers a deal between Bangladesh and Myanmar’s junta:

• Pilot repatriation of 10,000 refugees
• International monitoring limited to ASEAN
• Bangladesh agrees under donor pressure
• Returns face problems (lack of services, restrictions on movement)
• Process stalls after first batch

Scenario 3: Crisis Deterioration (Plausible)

• Major incident in camps (fire, violence, disease outbreak)
• Donors reduce funding further
• Host community protests turn violent
• Bangladesh unilaterally restricts refugee movement
• International condemnation

Scenario 4: Junta Collapse (Optimistic)

Myanmar’s military government falls:

• New government (federal democracy) takes power
• Genuine repatriation negotiations begin
• International funding increases
• ICJ case settles with Myanmar accepting responsibility
• Gradual, safe returns begin

Timeline: Unlikely before 2027 at earliest.

The Bottom Line

Bangladesh faces an impossible situation:

• Cannot keep refugees indefinitely (economic, environmental, political costs)
• Cannot return refugees safely (Myanmar’s war, ongoing persecution)
• Cannot force international solutions (donor fatigue, geopolitical divisions)

The interim government’s approach—maintain legal and moral positions while managing the crisis day to day—may not satisfy international critics. But it is the only viable option given the constraints.

What Bangladesh needs from the international community:

1. Predictable funding for humanitarian operations (5-year commitments, not annual appeals)
2. Pressure on Myanmar through sanctions and accountability, not just repatriation pressure on Bangladesh
3. Third-country resettlement expanded beyond token numbers
4. Support for host communities to address grievances

Until these materialize, Bangladesh will continue doing what it has done since 2017: bearing a burden the world created but refuses to share.