America's Bangladesh Dilemma: Democracy, Security, and the China Factor

The Washington Policy Debate

In the corridors of Washington D.C., Bangladesh policy has become a subject of intense debate—and considerable confusion. The July 2024 revolution that toppled Sheikh Hasina initially won bipartisan praise as a victory for democracy. Eighteen months later, that enthusiasm has given way to strategic anxiety.

The core tension: The United States wanted Bangladesh to be democratic. Bangladesh became democratic. But instead of aligning with Washington, Dhaka has pursued strategic autonomy that looks increasingly like a tilt toward Beijing.

A September 2025 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing titled “Bangladesh at a Crossroads: Democracy and the China Challenge” captured the dilemma. Senators grilled State Department officials on why U.S. support for Bangladesh’s democratic transition had not translated into geopolitical gains.

The response, revealingly, was that Bangladesh’s non-alignment was not anti-American—but “frankly, not what we hoped for.”

The China Factor in Washington’s Calculus

Nothing worries Washington more than Bangladesh’s deepening defense relationship with China. Specific developments causing U.S. concern:

1. The J-10CE Fighter Deal

In March 2025, Bangladesh entered advanced negotiations for the purchase of 16 Chinese J-10CE fighter jets valued at approximately $2.2 billion. If completed, this would be Bangladesh’s largest-ever defense purchase from China.

Why it matters: The J-10CE is a modern, multi-role fighter that would significantly upgrade Bangladesh’s air capabilities. More importantly, it would integrate Bangladesh into China’s defense ecosystem—training, spare parts, and doctrinal alignment.

2. Naval Cooperation

Bangladesh and China have expanded naval cooperation:

• Joint exercises in the Bay of Bengal (2024, 2025)
• Chinese assistance in modernizing Bangladesh’s submarine base
• Technology transfer for maritime domain awareness systems

For Washington, this raises questions about Bay of Bengal security and freedom of navigation.

3. The Trilateral Framework

In 2025, Bangladesh joined a China-Pakistan-Bangladesh trilateral dialogue framework. While officially focused on economic cooperation, U.S. analysts view it as a Chinese attempt to create a security coalition that includes Bangladesh.

4. BRI Deepening

Chinese investment in Bangladesh continues:

• Dhaka Elevated Expressway (operational)
• Payra Sea Port (under construction)
• Proposed deep-sea port at Sonadia
• Energy infrastructure investments

The U.S. view: These are not just economic projects, but strategic assets that give China leverage.

The Democracy Disconnect

Washington’s Bangladesh policy was supposed to be straightforward: support democracy, criticize authoritarianism. Hasina’s government was authoritarian; the Yunus government is democratic. The policy should write itself.

The reality is more complicated. Three factors explain the disconnect:

Factor 1: Expectations of Gratitude

There is a sentiment in Washington that Bangladesh “owes” the U.S. for supporting its democratic transition. U.S. sanctions on Rapid Action Battalion (2021) and pressure on the Hasina government were framed as contributing to the July Revolution.

Bangladesh’s perspective: The revolution was domestic, driven by Bangladeshi sacrifice. U.S. pressure was marginal at best. Dhaka owes no gratitude—only partnership based on mutual interests.

Factor 2: The Democracy Definition Gap

Washington defines democracy as elections + civil liberties + alignment with U.S. interests.

Bangladesh defines democracy as sovereignty + independent foreign policy + rejection of external domination.

These definitions don’t align. From Bangladesh’s view, aligning with Washington against China would compromise its sovereignty—making it not truly democratic.

Factor 3: The India Factor

Washington’s India strategy assumes that India should be the dominant security provider in South Asia. Bangladesh’s resistance to Indian hegemony—and willingness to work with China as a counterweight—complicates this framework.

The U.S. finds itself caught: supporting Bangladesh’s sovereignty (democratic principle) while wanting India’s regional primacy (strategic priority). The two positions are in tension.

Trade Policy: The Labor Rights Stick

The most tangible U.S. leverage over Bangladesh is trade—specifically, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that provides duty-free access for certain Bangladeshi products.

Status: GSP remains suspended since 2013 over labor rights concerns.

Impact: Bangladesh loses approximately $30-50 million annually in duty savings—not massive, but symbolically significant.

The problem: Bangladesh has made labor rights reforms since the democratic transition, allowing independent unions and improving workplace safety. But U.S. labor unions continue to block GSP restoration, arguing that enforcement remains inadequate.

From Dhaka’s perspective: “We do everything you ask on democracy and labor rights, and you still punish us. Meanwhile, you grant India trade preferences despite its democratic backsliding. This feels arbitrary.”

Rohingya Policy: Humanitarian Concerns vs. Strategic Realities

The U.S. is the largest donor to Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, providing over $2 billion in humanitarian assistance since 2017. This support is acknowledged and appreciated in Dhaka.

But tensions have emerged:

Repatriation Pressure

Washington has pressured Bangladesh to continue repatriation negotiations with Myanmar’s junta—arguing that refugees must return when conditions permit.

Bangladesh’s position: The junta cannot be trusted, repatriation cannot be safe, and Myanmar’s ongoing civil war makes returns impossible.

Dhaka views U.S. pressure as asking Bangladesh to sacrifice Rohingya safety to solve a humanitarian problem that Myanmar created.

Regional Diplomacy

The U.S. has pushed Bangladesh to join regional frameworks on Rohingya repatriation that include China and India. Dhaka has resisted, arguing that these frameworks legitimize Myanmar’s junta rather than holding it accountable.

The Congressional Bangladesh Caucus

In a surprising development, a bipartisan Congressional Bangladesh Caucus was formed in 2025 with 24 members. Key aspects:

Supporters:

• Progressive Democrats (human rights, democracy)
• Republican China hawks (want to pull Bangladesh from China’s orbit)

Goals:

• Restore GSP trade preferences
• Increase security cooperation (non-lethal)
• Support Rohingya humanitarian response
• Expand cultural and educational exchanges

Obstacles:

• Defense hawk Senators (oppose engagement with countries buying Chinese weapons)
• Labor unions (block trade preferences)
• India lobby (views Bangladesh through Delhi’s concerns)

The caucus’s existence shows bipartisan interest in Bangladesh, but internal divisions limit effectiveness.

What International Media Is Saying

Politico: “The Democracy That Disappointed”

“Washington backed Bangladesh’s democratic transition hoping for a partner. Instead, it got a government that talks to China, buys Chinese weapons, and refuses to pick sides. This was not the deal.”

Foreign Policy: “The Indo-Pacific’s Swing State”

“Bangladesh is the most important country you’re not paying attention to. With 170 million people, a $500 billion economy, and a strategic location, its alignment choices matter. So far, it’s choosing autonomy—and Washington hates that.”

The Economist: “China’s Gains in South Asia”

“While the U.S. focused on India as its primary South Asian partner, China methodically built influence in Bangladesh. Now Dhaka wants J-10 fighters, naval cooperation, and BRI projects. Washington is late to the game.”

Nikkei Asia: “America’s Bangladesh Blindspot”

“U.S. policy toward Bangladesh is stuck in a 2008 mindset when Hasina was seen as pro-Indian and China was a distant concern. The world has changed. Bangladesh has changed. Washington has not.”

The Strategic recalibration

In late 2025, signs emerged of a U.S. policy recalibration:

1. The NSA Visit

U.S. National Security Advisor visited Dhaka in November 2025—the highest-level U.S. visit since the democratic transition. The message: “We respect your sovereignty, but we need to talk about our concerns.”

2. Maritime Cooperation

The U.S. proposed expanded maritime security cooperation, focusing on:

• Counter-piracy operations
• Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
• Freedom of navigation operations (neutral framing)

Bangladesh’s response: Cautiously positive, provided it doesn’t target China.

3. Economic Offerings

Washington quietly signaled willingness to support:

• Bangladesh’s IMF program (already happening via U.S. quota)
• Private sector investment in renewable energy
• Technical assistance for financial sector reform

The message: “We can be an economic partner too, not just a security nag.”

Bangladesh’s Perspective: What Dhaka Wants

Bangladesh’s foreign ministry has been clear about its expectations from Washington:

1. Respect Sovereignty

Bangladesh is not India’s subordinate. It will not accept U.S. framing of Bangladesh policy through New Delhi’s lens. U.S. officials who reference “Indian concerns” in bilateral meetings are politely told that Bangladesh is an independent country.

2. Fair Trade Treatment

Restore GSP. Stop criticizing labor rights while ignoring Bangladesh’s progress. Recognize that the Rana Plaza aftermath led to genuine reforms, not cosmetic changes.

3. Security Autonomy

Bangladesh will buy weapons based on its needs, not U.S. preferences. If Chinese J-10s offer better value than American F-16s, Bangladesh will buy Chinese. This is not anti-American; it’s pro-Bangladesh.

4. Rohingya Solidarity

Support Bangladesh’s Rohingya position based on humanitarian principles, not strategic calculations about Myanmar’s junta or China’s influence.

5. Economic Investment

If the U.S. wants to counter Chinese influence, offer economic alternatives—not security lectures. Bangladesh needs infrastructure investment, technology transfer, and market access.

What Comes Next

Scenario 1: Continued Drift

U.S. policy remains confused, Bangladesh continues balancing act, China deepens influence. This is the baseline projection without significant policy changes.

Scenario 2: Pragmatic Reset

Washington accepts Bangladesh’s non-alignment, focuses on areas of cooperation (climate, health, education), and drops pressure over China. Trade preferences restored as a goodwill gesture. Relations improve modestly.

Scenario 3: Security Crisis

A major crisis in the Bay of Bengal (Chinese naval base proposal, for example) triggers U.S. pushback. Washington applies pressure on Bangladesh. Dhaka resists. Relations deteriorate.

Scenario 4: Democratic Solidarity

A new U.S. administration decides that supporting democratic transitions is more important than China competition. Significant U.S. investment in Bangladesh follows, reducing Chinese leverage without requiring alignment.

Most likely: Scenario 2 with elements of Scenario 1.

The Bottom Line

U.S.-Bangladesh relations are at an inflection point. Washington wanted a democratic partner. It got one—but a partner with its own mind, its own interests, and its own strategic calculus.

The question for 2026: Can Washington accept a Bangladesh that is democratic but not aligned? Or will U.S. China competition force a binary choice that pushes Dhaka further from the U.S. orbit?

For Bangladesh, the answer is clear: We will be democratic, we will be sovereign, and we will make our own choices. The U.S. can accept this reality—or continue struggling against it.